




Unconditional Transfers and Tropical Forest Conservation. 
Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Sierra Leone  
 
Abstract: Unconditional conservation payments are increasingly used by conservation non-
governmental organizations to further their environmental objectives. One key objective in 
many conservation projects that use such unconditional payments schemes is the protection of 
tropical forest ecosystems in buffer zone areas around protected parks where the scope of 
instating mandatory restrictions is more limited. We use a randomized controlled trial to 
evaluate the impact of unconditional livelihood payments to local communities on land use 
outside a protected area – the Gola Rainforest National Park – which is a biodiversity hotspot 
on the border of Sierra Leone and Liberia. High resolution RapidEye satellite imagery from 
before and after the intervention was used to determine land use changes in treated and control 
villages. We find support for the hypothesis that unconditional payments, in this setting, 
increase land clearance in the short run. The study constitutes one of the first attempts to use 
evidence from a randomized control trial to evaluate the efficacy of conservation payments and 
provides insights for further research.  
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Conservation payments to local communities have emerged as a prominent conservation tool 
(Ferraro 2001; Ferraro and Kiss 2002; Wunder 2007; Milne and Niesten 2009). Such payments 
are provided in different ways (e.g. as cash transfers or in kind payments) and with different 
degrees of conditionality and additionality (Engel 2015), reflecting a variation in policy 
preferences and contexts. Despite the prevalence of conservation payments there is a paucity 
of empirical evidence on their performance, especially using rigorous evaluation methods 
(Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006; Pattanayak, Wunder, and Ferraro 2010; Miteva, Pattanayak, and 
Ferraro 2012; Blackman 2012; Cowling 2014; Zheng et al. 2013; Alix-Garcia, Sims, and P. 
Yanez-Pagans  2015; Baylis et al. 2015; Puri et al. 2016; Samii et al. 2014; Börner et al. 2016, 
2017; Ma et al. 2017).  
 We contribute to addressing this gap in the literature by using a randomized control 
trial framework to empirically evaluate the conservation impact of one particular type of 
conservation aid: the provision of livelihood support to local communities without specific 
conditions attached. Such ‘unconditional conservation payments’ or transfers can be contrasted 
with so-called ‘payment for ecosystem service’ (PES) schemes which, at least in principle, 
entail conditionality such that payments are only made conditional on specific conservation 
efforts or outcomes (Ferraro et al. 2012; Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2007). Recent reviews of 
conservation funding suggest that, in practice, unconditional payments are a popular 
conservation policy mechanism (e.g., Miller 2014; Figaj 2010; Hoeffler and Outram 2011; 
Hicks et al. 2010), especially for promoting conservation outside protected areas (such as in 
reserve buffer zones). This reflects the realities of conservation policy implementation, which 
may preclude the introduction of strict conditionality clauses due to problems with assigning 
property rights and ownership over resources, problems with enforcement, and especially 
problems with the political acceptability of strict conditionality requirements (Kaczan, 





purported PES-type programs in tropical regions are effectively ‘unconditional’ in the sense 
that violation of conditionality is often not penalized (OECD 2010, Engel 2015, and Honey-
Roses et al. 2009). Unconditional payment schemes are also sometimes seen as potential 
precursors to eventual PES-type schemes (Caplow et al. 2011, Engel 2015).  
The aim of unconditional payments typically is to promote behaviors that align with 
the goals of the contributing entity, often to relieve pressure on ecologically important habitats. 
For example, in the context of rural Sierra Leone which we consider here, unconditional 
conservation payments aim to promote the preservation (or at least the maintenance) and 
connectivity of remaining forest habitats outside of a protected area known as the Gola 
Rainforest National Park. In this case, the ultimate policy objective of the park is to avoid 
encroachment of agriculture in the buffer area around the park, and so the creation of an isolated 
nature reserve within an agricultural landscape. Such ‘island parks’ may provide fewer 
ecosystem services (less wildlife protection etc.) and are more vulnerable to encroachment 
compared with parks in a better-preserved landscape context. They could therefore represent 
an un-viable and cost-ineffective investment in the long term (e.g., Hansen and DeFries 2007; 
DeFries et al. 2005; Gascon, Williamson, and da Fonseca 2000; Pfeifer et al. 2012). However, 
while perhaps convenient for conservationists and popular among recipients, it is not evident 
that unconditional payments are an efficient or effective way to influence land use decisions. 
Such payments not only work through more indirect mechanisms compared with conditional 
payments, there are also concerns that they could affect land use via multiple, possibly 
offsetting, channels.  
This article examines the short-term impacts of an unconditional payment scheme on 
land cover near the Gola Rainforest National Park (GRNP) in Eastern Sierra Leone. To our 
knowledge, this study constitutes one of the first randomized controlled trials (RCT) to analyze 





change.1 Beyond a project by Jayachandran et al. (2017) that was conducted concurrently to 
our study2 all previous work relies on observational data to assess the impacts of conservation 
policies on land cover (e.g. see Blackman 2012 for a review). Despite advances in using 
observational methods to assess conservation policies, important challenges remain in terms of 
the formulation of a counterfactual scenario, and in overcoming selection bias. In contrast in 
RCTs, such as the one discussed in this article, enrolment in the transfer program is based on 
random assignment such that treatment status is orthogonal to community characteristics and 
other possibly confounding effects (Gerber and Green 2012). We use land cover data obtained 
from high-resolution RapidEye multispectral satellite imagery for the period before and after 
the intervention to obtain an independent measure of our main outcome variable of interest: 
land clearance for agriculture. Our study focuses on the short-term impacts of payments on 
land cover, for two reasons. First, it is practically difficult to run an RCT spanning the large 
number of years that would be needed to examine long-term impacts on land use change 
(Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006). Second, the evaluation was designed in close partnership with 
the GRNP authorities who wanted to learn about the more immediate positive or potential 
harmful impacts of their payments on land use. 
The RCT randomly assigned 69 villages to treatment, where each village received an 
amount corresponding to US$15 (in vouchers) for each household, and 22 villages to the 
control group. Using detailed remote sensing data, we then compare the impact of the 
intervention on land use observed before and after the transfers were made. Our results suggest 
that for the case of Eastern Sierra Leone, with low population densities and relatively abundant 
land, unconditional payments lead to increased levels of land clearing for agriculture. This 
result is stable across a series of specifications and robustness checks. Importantly, we also 
show that increased land clearing is predominantly carried out on land with young vegetation 





unchanged. We use survey data to probe into possible mechanisms linking unconditional 
payments to land clearing. We note that our experimental design was not set up to explicitly 
test these mechanisms, and as a result our discussion is suggestive. The data suggest that 
unconditional transfers invite additional land clearing for agriculture by likely crowding-in of 
additional labor. Plausible mechanisms of how this could materialize are discussed.  
Conceptual Framework  
The main features of the conservation payment scheme described in this study were determined 
by the local policy context and project partners that manage the activities in and around the 
Gola Rainforest National Park. In close collaboration, the research team designed an impact 
evaluation of this scheme, and worked to ensure the scientific validity of the experimental 
protocol and the sampling procedure. Here we describe these features and embed them in the 
relevant literature. 
The conservation payment scheme evaluated here is akin to an unconditional transfer 
used extensively in many other areas of economic development policy (e.g., education, 
healthcare, labor projects). Empirical evidence suggests that unconditional transfers are a 
potentially cost-efficient and effective avenue for promoting policy objectives (see, for 
example, Kohler and Thornton 2011, Blattman, Fiala, and Martinez 2013). Several recent 
reports have shown how such payments are especially prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa 
(compared with Latin America and Asia (Davis, et al. 2016; Bastagli 2016; IDS 2009)). In 
practice a significant number of conservation payments are, either by design or due to lack of 
enforcement, unconditional (see Engel 2015, Honey-Roses et al. 2009). In our case, the NGO 
opted for an unconditional scheme for reasons related to the local policy context as well as 





Our specific unconditional payment scheme had some particular distinguishing 
features. First, our intervention has similarities to what is referred to by the literature as 
‘labelled unconditional transfers’ or ‘labelled cash transfers’ (see Benhassine et al. 2015). 
These schemes fall somewhere between pure conditional- and pure unconditional-transfers. 
The framing or labelling of the aid package makes the policy objectives more salient and 
generates a type of ‘endorsement effect’ (akin to that induced by various framing nudges). In 
our case, the NGO gave an unconditional aid package with a statement highlighting the 
environmental objectives of the NGO and the importance of preserving the Gola forests. 
Secondly, the intervention consisted of a one-off transfer, as opposed to recurrent 
payments. This design feature is also not unique to our case. Many unconditional transfers in 
real policy settings consist of one-off (or windfall) payments, provided once or over a very 
short period (Bastagli et al. 2016; Haushofer and Shapiro 2016). This can be explained by both 
logistical and budgetary reasons, but also reflects that these payments often aim to measure an 
initial short-term (trigger) reaction. Such one-off inducements also resemble behavioral 
‘nudges’ that have received considerable attention in the last few years both within academic 
and policy circles (see Benhassine et al. 2015). 
Thirdly, the amount provided in our intervention may appear somewhat more modest 
than that offered in other prominent one-off payment schemes (such as GiveDirectly which 
gives amounts close to $1000/household). In reality, the magnitude of payment per household 
varies considerably in such schemes, with many interventions, including community-driven 
development (CDD) projects, offering less than $10 per capita (see Casey (2018) for a review). 
The magnitude of one-off payments has varying impacts on multiple facets of behavior 
(savings, consumption patterns, wellbeing etc.). In our case, the offered amount (worth a 
nominal minimum value of up to US$15/household) was chosen on the basis of both policy 





measuring the short-term reaction of households to a moderate but non-trivial transfer. Their 
interest was to see if such an amount would lead to a discernable behavioral change to inform 
the design of future conservation policies. Also, the amount offered was close in magnitude to 
transfers of potential future REDD+ projects (a policy option that park authorities were 
considering as a means to finance conservation of the national park in the future).  
 Finally, the scheme offered payments in the form of vouchers that could be exchanged 
for goods as opposed to a direct cash transfer (see details below). Vouchers are extensively 
used in the field for numerous reasons.3 The relative significance of using in-kind vouchers 
versus cash transfers is subject to a limited but emerging empirical literature (e.g. Hidrobo et 
al. 2014; Aker 2017). 
 In sum, the intervention consisted of a labelled unconditional transfer scheme, made as 
a one-off payment, of a moderate but non-trivial size, which was offered in the form of 
vouchers. What is unique about our study is that we experimentally evaluate the use of 
unconditional payments in a conservation policy context. In the next section, we discuss some 
of the mechanisms through which these payments could impact behavior that may ultimately 
manifest in a discernable change in land cover.  
Unconditional payments and conservation  
While the impact of conditional payments (i.e. PES-type incentive schemes) on behavior and 
outcomes are well understood from a theoretical perspective (Wunder 2013;  Engel, Pagiola, 
and Wunder 2008; Engel 2015; Persson and Alpízar 2012), the mechanisms through which 
unconditional payments impact on conservation objectives are more complex and potentially 
ambiguous. 
Unconditional payments may promote conservation through various intermediary 





authorities, inviting reciprocal sentiments from local communities. As noted above, such 
payments are often made under a particular framing or labelling, normally with some reference 
to the donor’s policy aims and the benefits of these aims. This in turn acts as a nudge or trigger 
of an ‘endorsement effect’ or ‘community buy-in’ effect (as in the study by Benhassine et al. 
2015). This effect is similar to the ‘winning the hearts and minds’ argument for providing 
livelihood aid that has also been experimentally studied in several other contexts (McNeely 
1993, Andrabi and Das 2016; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2017).  
Secondly, payments may also relax binding constraints, enabling communities to alter 
their land use practices or engage in off-farm employment. Such behavioral changes could 
potentially reduce pressure on marginal lands (Wunder, Engel, and Pagiola 2008; Angelsen 
and Kaimowitz 1999). For example, transfers may be used to improve agricultural efficiency 
through increased fertilizer use, reducing pressure at the “extensive margin” to grow food and 
thus allowing more land to be preserved for conservation (Phalan et al. 2011; Bationo et al. 
2012; Louhichi & Gomez y Paloma 2014). Alternatively, households can be ‘trapped’ in sub-
optimal labor allocation decisions, allocating more labor on farm (and exerting excessive 
pressure on natural resources) because of binding constraints that deter them from accessing 
more profitable off-farm labor opportunities. Conservation payments (even with very low 
levels of conditionality in practice) may relax these constraints (such as liquidity constraints) 
and allow rural households to break this cycle of poverty and environmental degradation 
(Uchida, Rozelle, and Jintao 2009; Groom et al. 2010). In addition, there could be an “income 
effect” associated with transfers, which could increase the demand for leisure. In the context 
of labor scarcity and imperfect labor markets, extra consumption of leisure could also relieve 
pressure on natural habitat.  
However, the impact of transfers need not necessarily be benign, and they might 





land management practices that encourage additional land clearance (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 
2001, Lybbert et al. 2011). In the case of Sierra Leone where shortage of local labor generally 
limits agricultural activity (Cartier & Bürge 2011; MAFFS, SSL, and IPA-SL 2012; Chenoune 
et al. 2016), and where the majority of hired labor is used for clearing vegetation for farming 
(MAFFS, SSL, and IPA-SL 2012), unconditional payments could be used to hire additional 
labor to convert more forest land to farm land. Moreover, one time (windfall) unconditional 
payments may trigger strategic behavior from recipients that could be detrimental to 
conservation. In particular, aid recipients may clear more land in order to better position 
themselves in an anticipated future negotiation setting (Harstad 2016).  
Of course, it is also possible that payments are spent in ways that do not impact on land 
use practices in any discernible way. Further, it is likely that the impact of payment schemes 
will vary across communities, mediated by factors such as market access and agricultural 
suitability (Pfaff 1999; Kinnaird et al. 2003; Pfaff et al. 2009), or that large-scale transfer 
schemes have general equilibrium effects (affecting prices of factors and commodities) in the 
case that local economies are imperfectly integrated in regional economies (e.g. Angelsen et 
al. 2001). For example, if local demand for labor increases, wages are bid up which might 
invite an inflow of agricultural labor. Similarly, income transfers to the poor (especially if 
significant and recurrent) can increase demand for land intensive consumption goods which, 
under certain conditions, can lead to increases in deforestation. For example, Alix-Garcia et al. 
(2013) explore the impact of the Oportunidades program on deforestation in Mexico. The 
authors find a significant increase in deforestation and attribute this to a shift in the 
consumption of more land-intensive goods (such as meat and milk). Further, the adverse effect 
on deforestation is higher in communities that are isolated and have inferior access to markets 
so they cannot meet the increase demand from outside sources. Yet, as discussed by the authors, 





an increase in income leads to higher demand for forest products which could in turn cause a 
reduction in deforestation (as in Foster and Rosenzweig 2003). Beyond local context, the 
frequency of payments, whether the extra source of income is earned or not earned, the 
stringency and nature of the conditions attached to aid funds, and the size of payments, all 
modulate impacts (Shively and Pagiola 2004). 
Overall, theoretical predictions with respect to the conservation effects of unconditional 
payments are not easily predetermined. In our case, the one-off payments are hypothesized to 
have intermediate effects on incomes and expenditure (on both consumptive goods and inputs) 
as well as on attitudes (“hearts and minds”), which in turn may impact on land use decisions – 
the final outcome variable of interest. Assessing even the existence and direction, positive or 
negative, of such effects, regardless of the mechanism of impact, remains an empirical matter 
which to date has been sparingly and non-systematically explored.  
Context of the study: Land use in Sierra Leone  
Our empirical study is based in rural Sierra Leone, in an area surrounding the Gola Rainforest 
National Park (GRNP) on the international border with Liberia (see Panel (A) of figure 1). The 
GRNP is a 71,000 hectare remnant of upper Guinean moist tropical forest, and spans seven 
chiefdoms across the districts of Kailahun, Kenema and Pujehun. The forest was officially 
established as a national park in 2011, but its protection has been evolving over the last 20 
years through efforts by external NGOs and local governments and conservation agencies. 
Protection of the GRNP derives foremost from restrictions on logging and extraction of plant, 
animal and mineral resources from within its boundaries. Most of the efforts and resources of 
the GRNP authorities are to compensate local communities for these restrictions, or to monitor 
and enforce them. Due to the establishment of the GRNP, compensation for direct losses of 





of the GRNP boundary. Our study villages are located within a one to seven mile band from 
the GRNP boundary, and therefore they have not received direct conservation payments in the 
past. Satellite images and field observations suggests that the objectives of protecting forest 
cover inside the reserve itself have been largely met (Gola Rainforest Conservation LG. 2013). 
<< Insert figure 1 about here >> 
In recent years, the GRNP authorities have emphasized the promotion of sustainable 
land management in forest areas beyond the reserve boundaries, where legal restrictions on 
resource-use enacted to protect the GRNP do not apply.  
In our study region (figure 1, panel A), agricultural practices are typified by subsistence 
slash-and-burn rotational cropping of annual crops (upland rice, cassava, vegetables). There 
are also plantations of cash crops such as coffee, cacao and oil palm. The use of fertilizer in the 
region is very low, as most communities do not have access to the necessary markets, and 
transportation costs are prohibitive for most farmers (Cartier & Bürge 2011; Casaburi, 
Glennerster, and Suri 2013). There is a marked dry and wet season in Sierra Leone, and as such 
there is one agricultural cycle per year. To establish a new upland farm, natural vegetation is 
cleared (“brushed”) using machetes, and after allowing the cut vegetation time to dry, 
controlled fires are then set to clear the area ready for planting. Clearing occurs at the beginning 
of the year, mostly in January and February, and burning in March and April. Afterwards the 
land is ploughed and sown, and harvests are typically reaped in September – December. Many 
rice fields are intercropped with crops such as cassava, which leads to a longer harvest period. 
Despite this, there is still a marked ‘lean season’ in June and July, before the first harvests of 
the year. Large work groups of laborers are especially advantageous due to the critical timing 
of certain agricultural activities, primarily burning. Dry weather is needed between vegetation 
clearance and burning to ensure a good burn on the field, which maximizes the nutrients 





the yields that can be achieved (Richards 1986). Although burning may only take half a day, it 
can require larger groups of workers to control the fire and ensure it does not spread to 
neighboring fields. Cleared land generally remains under cultivation for 2 – 3 years, until the 
soil nutrients are depleted or the weed and pest load becomes too great. After this, the land is 
left fallow for 6 – 10 years (Bulte et al. 2013), during which time scrub vegetation and young 
secondary forest will establish, known as ‘farmbush’, and in doing so regenerate soil nutrients 
for the next agricultural cycle. Mature forest in our context is forested land that has never been 
farmed, or that has been left fallow for more than 25 years. These forests contain larger trees 
and represent a more valuable habitat from a conservation perspective, being a more 
structurally and species diverse habitat than farmbush and a larger store of aboveground 
carbon. Farms established on land cleared from mature forests are typically higher yielding and 
allow for shorter fallow periods for the first few agricultural cycles than farms cleared from 
farmbush, due to higher concentrations of soil nutrients and fewer weeds. However, despite 
being potentially lucrative, clearance of the large trees in mature forest is strenuous for farmers 
in Sierra Leone as most farmers clear land by hand using low-grade machetes. Establishing a 
farm from mature forest therefore requires more labor (initially), compared with farms 
established from farmbush. 
Labor is a significant limiting factor for agricultural activity in Sierra Leone. Survey 
responses to the national Agricultural Household Tracking Survey (AHTS) for Sierra Leone 
(MAFFS, SSL, and IPA-SL 2012) confirm that most households (80%) in eastern Sierra Leone 
hire external labor at some point in the agricultural cycle, and for all agricultural activities more 
than half of households reported a shortage of labor. The peak demand for hired labor occurs 
between January and March, when land is being cleared and burned to establish new farms. 
Land clearance is also the agricultural activity for which labor shortage is reported as the most 





approximately 1/3rd of annual labor requirements on farms in Sierra Leone come from hired 
labor, with the rest from reciprocal labor agreements within the community, and from 
household labor. The mean reported wage for general agricultural labor in the AHTS for eastern 
Sierra Leone is 6822 Leones per day (1.7 USD/day), including the value of in-kind payments 
and meals.  
Agricultural expansion and habitat fragmentation is believed to be the primary threat to 
mature forests both within, and surrounding, the national park (Gola Rainforest Conservation 
LG 2013). The extent of agricultural land and forest fragmentation can be seen in the land cover 
map shown in figure 2. The figure clearly shows the extent of slash and burn agriculture 
depicted in the yellow and light green areas that are overwhelmingly surrounding the park, and 
relatively few areas of mature forest remain in the zone outside the national park boundary. 
Since the national park is not one contiguous area of forest cover, but rather split into blocks 
(two large and two small), the maintenance of mature forest patches outside of the national 
park is particularly important to enhance the connectivity of habitat between the national park 
blocks. Forest patches such as these have been hypothesized to act as stepping stones for the 
movement of animal and plant species across the landscape (Saura, Bodin, and Fortin 2014). 
For this reason, GRNP authorities have explored means for providing incentives to lessen 
potential pressures for forest conversion outside the protected area. Since conditional payments 
were regarded as unpractical (on both logistical and “political acceptability” grounds), 
unconditional payments have been used in this study as the preferred policy mechanism.5, 6  
 
Experimental design 
We use data from a field experiment in which one-off payments were made to randomly 





Community Development scheme involving 91 villages within 1 – 7 miles of the GRNP 
boundary (figure 1, panel A). In total, 69 villages received an unconditional aid transfer and 22 
did not, with random selection of treatment villages stratified at the chiefdom level. 7 Under 
this scheme, each of the 69 treated villages were given vouchers worth up to 60,000 Leones 
(SLL), approximately 15 USD, for each household in the village. This amount per household 
is cash equivalent to nine days wages for unskilled labor (MAFFS, SSL, and IPA-SL 2012). 
The total value of payments to treatment villages therefore varied between villages, dependent 
on the number of households in the village (mean household number in our study villages was 
just below 40). Payments were made by the NGO and described as a gesture of goodwill to 
promote sustainable management of forests, and to improve livelihoods. Treated villages were 
not given any instructions as to what to do with their aid, nor were any conditions attached for 
receiving it (see Annex 3 for a representative MoU between GRNP and a local village and 
Annex 4 for a representative consent form).  
The NGO had hypothesized possible indirect channels through which aid could trigger 
land use changes with implications for conservation, but they purposefully left the set-up of 
the aid distribution flexible.8 The research aim was not to test any particular mechanism but to 
explore if (in principle) the payments could trigger a discernable short term impact on land use 
decisions. These could be plausibly through intermediate effects on incomes and expenditure 
(of both consumptive goods and inputs) as well as on attitudes (‘community buy-in’). No cash 
was distributed in the program. Instead, treated communities could use the vouchers to order 
goods from a pre-specified list (see Annex 2).9 This list included 41 consumption, investment 
and public goods such as food, tools, agricultural inputs, and building materials. Prices on the 
goods menu reflected local market prices in Kenema, however since the payments were made 
in-kind the actual value of the aid package is higher than the nominal value of the vouchers as 





remote communities.10 The goods list contained not only prices and item descriptions, but also 
pictures to facilitate comprehension by illiterate respondents. Vouchers came in increments of 
10,000 Leones, and each had a unique identification code. The vouchers were unique to each 
village and only valid within the village of origin, and for the duration of the intervention. 
Households could choose to spend vouchers individually, to bundle them and spend them with 
other households, or even pool them at the village level. Of course, how the aid was actually 
utilized is not directly observable, nor were implications in terms of fungibility of the aid. In 
order to gain some insights as to where and how aid was spent follow-up survey data were 
collected with the village chiefs (when aid was initially distributed) and with the household 
recipients of the vouchers (at end-line). 
The funds were transferred to treatment villages between the end of April 2011, and 
beginning of June 2011, with the majority of payments delivered in May 2011. The timing of 
our payments came after the peak labor demand in 2011, when new farms had already been 
established for that year. The next substantial demand for hired agricultural labor would be at 
the beginning of the agricultural cycle in February 2012, and farms established by clearing land 
during this period would bring land into active management for 2-3 years from that date. Our 
satellite observations were taken in January 2011 (prior to the intervention) and December 
2012/January 2013, after the full agricultural cycle of 2012 and before clearing had begun for 
the agricultural cycle in 2013. Any differences in land cover between our control and treatment 
villages are therefore most likely to have come as a result of activities during 2012 agricultural 
cycle.  
Description of land cover data 
Our main outcome or dependent variable is land cover change, classified from satellite 





objectively and accurately measured than outcome variables from a survey module on stated 
and recalled land use. For the land cover data, we use high resolution RapidEye multispectral 
satellite imagery at 5x5 m pixel resolution from before (dated 13 January 2011) and after (dated 
6 December 2012 and 21 January 2013) the intervention (see panels B and C in figure 1).11 We 
classified the satellite data into the categories of bare soil, farmbush (including all non-forest 
vegetation), mature forest and water. Definitions of these types of land cover are provided in 
table 1 (see also Annex 5 for details of the classification method).12 Water pixels (0.33%) in 
either 2011 or 2012/13 were excluded from the analysis. 
The difference in land cover classifications between the 2011 and 2012/13 images is 
summarized in figure 2. Since the study period was rather short, it is not surprising that land 
cover changes are generally small in magnitude. In this study, we define land clearance as land 
that was classified as farmbush or mature forest in 2011, and classified as bare in 2013. As 
might be expected, within the GRNP boundary very little land clearance took place.13 For our 
analyses we only consider land cover outside the GRNP where the land is owned and managed 
by communities.14 Within the study area, a little under 3700 ha of vegetation was cleared (forest 
or farmbush vegetation in 2011 to bare land in 2012/2013), representing 8.62% of the total 
area, and 10.6% of all land that could potentially be used for agriculture (farmbush or forest in 
2011). At the same time, just over 4470 ha of land transitioned from bare soil to vegetation, 
representing 10.4% of total land. Contiguous patches of clearance from farmbush (median size 
= 100m2, interquartile range = 25m2 to 375m2) are generally larger than those cleared from 
mature forest (median size = 75m2, interquartile range = 25m2 to 375 m2). In total, 321,100 
patches of farmbush were cleared in the study area, compared with just 69,830 patches of 
mature forest.  
Due to cloud cover, the RapidEye images do not cover 12 out of the study 91 villages. 





control. These missing villages are all in the North East of the study area, and all but one 
originate from the same chiefdom. Due to our block randomization at the chiefdom level, 
dummies in the analysis soak up the different treatment propensities within each block. 
Dropping the block with most missing data from the analysis does not alter the results (see 
Annex 1, table A1 and A2).  
<< Insert table 1 about here >> 
 
As is common in this region, precise boundaries of land holdings per village are 
unknown. However, we have data on total estimated land-holdings from socio-economic 
surveys implemented in 2011, and so attributed land to villages via weighted Voronoi 
polygons. The polygons rest on the initial assumption that the farmer for any given plot of land 
is from the village with the shortest Euclidean distance to that land. We then expand or contract 
our polygons using land-holding data from our surveys to improve the estimation of land 
boundaries, validated against 98 GPS locations of known village boundaries collected in the 
field. For more information on this procedure see Wilebore and Coomes (2016).15 In total, the 
Voronoi polygons of the 79 study villages cover 42,866 ha, with a median village size of 470 
ha (interquartile range 279 ha – 655 ha). 
Description of survey data  
Baseline and endline surveys were collected. In each village, approximately 30 households 
were randomly selected. These surveys provide a series of baseline characteristics so as to 
compare our villages and evaluate the randomization process. Table 2 presents summary 
statistics of variables from these surveys at baseline, as well as a balance test between treatment 
and control villages. Differences are small and 30 out of the 33 variables have a p-value >0.1, 





socio-economic, and institutional variables. The three variables that show some imbalance are: 
perceived quality of the village chief at baseline (which proxies for institutional quality; see 
Voors et al. 2017), average age and proximity to main road (which captures access to markets). 
We control for these variables by including them as covariates in the regressions below.  
 
<< Insert table 2 about here >> 
 
Estimation strategy 
Our main identification strategy is simple and rests on the fact that, by design, treatment 
assignment is exogenous to land use. To assess how unconditional payments affect clearance 
of new land for farming, we simply calculate the area of land per village (in hectares) that was 
classified as vegetation (as either mature forest or farmbush vegetation) in the first period 
(2011) and transitioned to a classification of ‘bare soil’ in the second period (2013). This 
represents the land that has been actively cleared during the period between the two 
observations, which is the main response variable of interest in our study. We then run an OLS 
model such that:  
(1)  𝑌𝑗 =  𝛼𝑘 +  𝛽𝑇𝑗 + 𝜂𝐶𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗     
where 𝑌𝑗 captures change in land cover class (measured in hectares) between baseline 
(2011) and end line (2013) for village j, (with j = 1, ..., 79). 𝑇𝑗 is a binary treatment variable 
where T=1 indicates that the village received a transfer payment, and εj is the usual village-
level error term. The parameter 𝛽 is our outcome of interest, the amount of land cover change 
due to the transfer payment. We run a set of three models with different definitions of 𝑌𝑗, in 
particular: (i) where we look at changes from any vegetated land (either ‘mature forest’ or 





‘bare’ in end line, and; (iii) changes from ‘mature forest’ in baseline to ‘bare’ in end line. 
Separating by type of land clearance is important from a policy perspective as we would like 
to examine whether the transfer program affects the type of vegetation that is targeted for 
clearing. For example, if payments induce a shift from the clearing of mature forest towards 
the clearing of farmbush, this could be interpreted a conservation success, even in the absence 
of any reduction in overall gross amount of cleared land. Alternatively, if payments lead to 
higher levels of cleared land, then we would like to know if these new farms are being 
established from land that was previously farmbush, or whether they are being established 
through the clearance of mature forest and leading to a net reduction in mature forest outside 
of the GRNP. All base models include chiefdom fixed effects 𝛼𝑘, since randomization occurred 
within chiefdoms, and variables that control for any unbalanced baseline characteristics 
between treated and control villages 𝐶𝑗. 
As a robustness check we estimate the effect of transfers on the probability of clearing 
individual pixels. We use a set of about 4500 randomly selected points from across the study 
area, with a minimum sampling distance of 100m between points to reduce the chance of 
sampling the same farm more than once, and to avoid spatial autocorrelation (see similar 
methods used in Gaveau et al. 2009; Pfaff et al. 2009; Nelson & Chomitz 2011). Specifically, 
we estimate,  
(2) 𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛼𝑘 +  𝛽𝑇𝑗 + 𝜂𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    
where our outcome variable now represents 𝑌𝑖𝑗 a dummy for pixel i in village j, which 
captures changes in land cover class between baseline (2011) and end line (2013) at a specific 
point location. The term εij are standard errors clustered at the village level, to capture that 
intra-village pixels are not independent. 
 The benefit of this pixel level approach is that it allows us to capture topographical and 





village. Variables included (as suggested by relevant literature e.g. Pfaff et al. 2009; Deininger 
and Minten 2002; Li et al. 2014; Busch and Ferretti-Gallon 2017) are distance to GRNP 
boundary, slope (derived from remotely sensed 1 arc second SRTM Digital Terrain Elevation 
Data, and reflecting potential agricultural productivity of each plot), as well as village-polygon 
(area) size.16 
In Annex 1, we also present robustness analysis focusing on dropping a randomization 
block with most missing data, transformations of the main dependent variable, heterogeneous 
treatment effects, and analysis not based on remote sensing data but on survey-based measures 
capturing agricultural activity. 
Results 
First, we report the results of land cover change detected from satellite imagery, and then we 
use survey data to probe our main findings and document plausible mechanisms. 
Land change impacts: Table 3 and 4 present our main results. In table 3, Columns (1) and (2) 
assess program impacts on the change (in hectares) of vegetated land to bare land between 
2011 and 2013. Column (1) presents the results from the base model (Eq.1). Column (2) adds 
controls to account for imbalance in baseline variables. The main result is that unconditional 
transfers increase the conversion of land from vegetation to bare soil, compared with control 
villages. The coefficient is significant with p<0.05 in all model specifications. The base model 
suggests that on average 19.1 ha more land is cleared in treated villages than in controls, 
(approx. 3.5% of the mean area size of the typical village in our study).  
Assessing the type of vegetation that is being cleared during the study period, we see 
that new farms are predominantly established from younger vegetation (‘farm bush’), see 
columns (3) and (4). Columns (5) and (6) assess if clearance of mature forest is higher in treated 





suggesting that mature forest areas were not targeted in this additional (program induced) land 
clearance.  
 
<< Insert Tables 3, 4, >> 
 
Table 4 reports on Eq.2 (the pixel level models). The main findings with respect to the 
treatment effect on land clearance are similar to those reported in table 3. The intervention 
significantly increases the amount of total vegetation clearance, and again does not have a 
significant effect on mature forest. We thus see that this additional bare land has been 
established through the clearance of farmbush. The size of the treatment effect in the base 
model - column 1 in table 4 - (i.e. about 3.4%) is similar to that of table 3 (i.e. ATE = 19 ha, 
mean village size within our sample is 542 ha, 19/542 = 3.5%). With controls – column 2 in 
table 4 - this is increased slightly to 4 percentage points.  
The interpretation of the added control variables in the pixel level model is in accord 
with expectations. There is less land clearance further from roads (signaling that land clearance 
is correlated with access to output and input (labor) markets) and on steeper land (signaling 
that have steeper slopes are potentially less suitable for agriculture, or harder to access). For 
example, several studies documented that plots with shallower slopes and low elevations are 
favored for agricultural expansion due to their higher agricultural returns (Kinnaird et al. 2003; 
Nakakaawa, Vedeld, and Aune 2011). Similarly, proximity to roads tends to increase the 
probability of a plot being deforested as roads increase accessibility to previously remote sites 
(Chomitz & Gray 1996; Nelson & Hellerstein 1997; Pfaff 1999; Alves 2002; Dalle, Pulido, 
and De Blois 2011) and distance to both settlements and roads can be used as proxies for market 
access (Pfaff 1999; Cropper, Puri, and Griffiths 2001), although we note that this is not always 





Additional robustness checks are presented in Annex 1 in Tables A1 and A2, dropping 
the randomization block with (most of the) missing data from the analysis. We also re-run 
Equation 1, transforming the main dependent variable in logs and taking proportions, see table 
A3. All the results from the robustness analysis are highly similar to the results presented in 
tables 3 and 4.  
Survey data: We asked program recipients directly how the vouchers affected their land use 
and labor input. Table 5 presents summary statistics of the responses. Approximately 29% of 
the treatment group stated that they converted more land as a result of the aid treatment, and a 
similar 30% of them stated that they increased labor inputs to agricultural, logging and other 
activities as a result of the vouchers. This suggests that vouchers (or the fungibility of this aid 
modality) relaxed a binding constraint on land clearing.  
 
<<<Insert table 5>>>>> 
 
We also included follow up questions to probe into the reasons behind the responses of 
table 5. These were asked as open-ended questions that provided a wealth of qualitative 
information. We examined over 2800 individual responses and classified them into response 
categories. The results are in Tables A4a-c and A5a-c in the Annex 1. In table A4c (reasons for 
farming more), we see that approximately 55% of treated households stated that they hired 
additional labor (either from outside or inside their own household) to work more and expand 
their farm. Another 8% stated that aid was used to acquire tools in order to clear land. Another 
30% used the aid to buy other (non-labor) agricultural inputs (predominately more seeds). This 
could increase yields in the year when aid was delivered, which could provide the means for 





Table A5 summarizes responses to open ended qualitative questions on the reasons why 
households changed the amount they worked as a result of the aid. We see that, for respondents 
that worked more as a result of aid, 82% did so on farm-related activities (only 2.5% used the 
aid to work more off-farm). In many of these responses households stated that the aid was 
mostly helpful to expand their farm (through hiring labor) and that is was then easier to increase 
their own labor for the subsequent farming activities (such as harvesting). This qualitative data 
is, of course, only suggestive of how the aid could have brought about the observed result. Still, 
given the clear trend in the responses obtained it appears that the ability to hire labor for 
clearing land for farming played a significant part. 
Future research should evaluate exactly which constraint on land use was lifted by our 
intervention. Our data are not sufficiently fine-grained to do this (in particular because we 
lacked baseline data on agricultural activity). We did collect some income variables (such as 
farm labor, selling produce and savings) during the endline, enabling us to compare behavior 
of households in the treated and control villages. In many cases, we found no difference 
between treatment and control villages, possibly due to the coarse or imprecise nature of the 
estimates (see table A6). We do, however, have access to baseline and endline values for the 
number of bushels of rice harvested by each household. This variable also suffers from 
imprecise measurement, but should give a good indication of agricultural production during 
the 2012 agricultural cycle. Specifically, we estimate: 
hjt2=α+ β1Τ+ β2(Τ· hjt1) +β3 hjt1 +εj     (4) 
where hjt2 is the bushels of rice harvested at endline and hjt1 is the corresponding variable at 
baseline. Table 6 presents the results, showing that the interaction term is positive and 
significant (at the 5% level). This suggests that treated farmers with larger initial yields 
increased agricultural outputs (harvested rice).17 We cannot say if this was due to increased 





explain our observations of increased land clearance in treated villages. In support of this 
argument, we note that in larger treatment villages more land was cleared (see table A7). 
 
<<<Insert table 6>>>>> 
 
Our empirical results potentially have important implications for our perception of rural 
communities at the forest edge in Sierra Leone. Our findings suggest that farmers increased 
land clearance within two years after the receipt of the unconditional transfer. Under the socio-
economic context of the study region, the observed additional land clearance would have been 
made possible primarily through utilizing additional labor inputs and secondarily by acquiring 
additional smaller scale farming tools. Accessing or employing larger land clearing machinery 
would be unlikely in our case, as this is rare in the area.  
There could be more than one mechanism through which transfers lead to additional 
land clearing inputs and explain the observed treatment effect. The finding that a one-off 
transfer increases farm size suggests farms at baseline were considered “too small” – below 
conventional equilibrium levels dictated by marginal benefits and costs of effort. In a world 
with perfect capital markets, a one-off transfer should not affect optimal farm size. Farmers 
would borrow funds to finance an expansion to the optimal size. In the absence of the transfer, 
why did farmers not cultivate more extensive areas if this is privately optimal in the sense of 
equating marginal benefits and costs of effort? The literature provides two possible 
explanations.  
First, smallholders may be extremely resource-constrained and cannot afford to 
increase their farm size over time – not even marginally (or if they do, they approach the 
optimal farm size very slowly and are currently “out of equilibrium”). This possibility might 





and have very imperfect socially-mediated access to capital for productive purposes. In a recent 
study, Chenoune et al. (2017) explore consumption and production decisions for agricultural 
households in Sierra Leone and emphasize the importance of rice seed. In general, rice seed is 
self-produced from the previous year’s harvest, and not purchased on the market. Farmers must 
decide how much rice to consume, and how much to save for planting the following year – not 
an easy decision in our study area, which is the most food insecure region of the country with 
a marked ‘hungry season’. Farmers are constrained in how much seed they can store for the 
following agricultural year. 
Further, a large determinant of yield in upland rice farming is the density of seed that 
is sown. Chenoune et al. (2016) find that the predominant factor affecting seeding density, and 
therefore production in the current year, is the amount of rice that has been stored as seed from 
the previous year. The timing of the intervention payments in our study - after clearing but at 
the time of sowing - suggest that farmers who spent their cash transfer on rice seed, or on goods 
that they would otherwise have needed to use rice to pay for (rice is known to be used as an 
effective currency in our study area) are likely to have been able to achieve higher sowing 
densities as a result of the intervention. We hypothesize that this would have increased yields 
in the 2011 harvest, and therefore acted as a form of value transfer to the following February, 
where larger rice harvests would increase the resource available for hiring labor. We do not 
have yield data on the 2011 agricultural cycle, so we cannot test this hypothesis directly. 
However, Chenoune et al. (2016; 2017) and interview evidence from our study area collected 
since, suggest that this seems to be a likely mechanism. Also, over 60% of the response to our 
open-ended questions on the reasons why treated villagers “farmed more” are in line with this 
plausible mechanism (shown in Tables A4c), while 30% of these responses explicitly stating 





The second explanation for why a one-off transfer may affect farm size eventuates when 
production is characterized by locally increasing returns and multiple equilibria. If the transfer 
enables households to “switch” to an alternative production process that generates higher 
returns but that requires a minimum project size to be profitable (such as felling of forest by 
labor teams), then one-off transfers could invite an escape from a poverty trap to an alternative 
equilibrium with higher income and less forest (Carter and Barrett 2006). This may happen 
when households cannot finance the cost of the “switch” by (strategic) borrowing – a condition 
discussed above. Farmers should also be forward-looking for this strategy to work, and they 
should be sufficiently patient to save the transfer through the lean season (as transfers were 
paid in May and land clearing did not commence until January the next year). Carter and Barrett 
(2006) discuss such dynamics, based on temporary “tightening of the belt” in the context of 
asset-based poverty analysis. However, we realize that saving liquid assets in an environment 
of poverty and need, characterized by an informal sharing imperative, is far from easy for many 
households. Future work should establish whether seasonal savings are indeed feasible, 
enabling rural households to exit from one equilibrium (poverty trap) to another. 
Lastly, using data obtained from the Agricultural Household Tracking Survey (AHTS) 
for Sierra Leone (MAFFS, SSL, and IPA-SL 2012), we apply a plausibility test for the 
magnitude of the treatment effect that we observe. In the village level models, we find a 
treatment effect of approximately 19 additional hectares of land cleared in treated compared 
with untreated villages. The average village in our study has just under 40 households (SD 26) 
and, at an average labor wage of $1.7 per day (AHTS), this transfer would equate up to 
approximately nine days of general agricultural labor per household, or up to 360 days of labor 
for the village. From Johnny, Karimu, and Richards (1981), the clearing of new agricultural 
land requires approximately 10 days of labor per ha, so for an average treatment effect of 19 





was delivered by our treatment (360 days), and would require a at least 50% of the payments 
to be spent on labor. In Annex 6, we present a more elaborate analysis under various 
assumptions on the percentage of aid used for labor and over different productivity ranges. The 
magnitude of the treatment effect was found to be plausible under a range of assumptions with 
respect to key productivity parameters. These figures are, of course, rough estimates and 
designed only to give a back-of-the-envelope indication of the plausibility for our results. It is 
also worth noting that since the payments were given to the villages in kind, rather than as cash, 
the value of the payments was greater than their nominal amount due to the additional value of 
sourcing and transporting goods to these remote locations, which can be substantial. This 
further strengthens the possibility that sufficient labor could be mobilized by the value of aid 
in this study to explain the treatment effect that we observe.  
Discussion and conclusions 
Conservation organizations increasingly use unconditional transfers to promote the 
conservation of natural habitats. Such transfers are uncontroversial and popular among 
recipients, easy to deliver and scale up (provided sufficient funding is available) and hold the 
promise of killing multiple birds with one stone; promoting conservation and improving the 
livelihoods of some of the world’s poorest people. Further, these instruments are particularly 
attractive outside protected areas where the scope of instating conditionality on land use is 
more limited. However, to our knowledge this is one on the few studies that uses a randomized 
controlled trial to evaluate such policies. The use of an RCT approach (as opposed to 
observational data) has the potential advantage of leveraging identification from variation in 
transfers that is exogenous by design.18  
By combining our RCT with high-resolution satellite data we find that, in our case, such 





agricultural system over short time scales. Yet, we do not find evidence that this clearance is 
targeted towards mature forests. Rather, clearance of vegetation comes from farmbush (non-
mature fallowed land) that is already in the agricultural cycle. Our survey data could not 
illuminate the intermediary variables that caused the observed impact on the final outcome 
variable, nor could we decisively show the exact mechanisms. The results from Tables 6 and 
the associated qualitative responses from households suggest that the additional land clearance 
that we observe in treated villages could have plausibly been achieved through hiring additional 
labor. This finding is consistent with research from the same study area (see Mokuwa et al. 
2011) that shows that agricultural labor demand is much higher for initial land clearing (mostly 
undertaken by men in the early months of the year) as compared to subsequent farming 
activities such as weeding, plowing, or harvesting (mostly undertaken by women). The 
treatment could have (at least in the short run) alleviated this land clearing constraint, with the 
additional (male) labor likely being hired in from the community (working more than usual) or 
from external so called ‘labor teams’ found in rural parts of Sierra Leone (see Peeters et al. 
2009). However, the channels through which additional labor for land clearing could have been 
utilized are not readily tractable from the data. Taking into consideration the socio-economic 
context of our study site, as well as the timing of the intervention within the agricultural 
production cycle, we have proposed a few plausible explanations. Further empirical testing is 
warranted to explore how aid would impact labor and land allocation decisions if it were 
delivered at different times during the agricultural cycle. 
Our findings should not be misconstrued as an argument against payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) schemes. A crucial difference between such schemes and the one we 
study here is that, in our case, there was no quid pro quo requirement; receiving communities 
were not required to alter their behavior in return for the payment, and so any impact of the 





purchase of land-saving technology, “general equilibrium effects” discouraging local 
deforestation). Provided conditionality is enforced, theory predicts that PES should be more 
effective in curbing deforestation than unconditional payments by directly paying people to 
supply ecosystem services (Ferraro 2001, Persson and Alpízar 2012, Pagiola and Platais 2007). 
Recent empirical evidence from an RCT by Jayachandran et al. (2017) in Uganda on a PES 
scheme with a higher degree of conditionality, but which similarly to our case entailed a one-
off payment (of comparable size) within a 2 – 3 year time span, shows that payments do lead 
to enhanced levels of avoided deforestation compared to a control group. These payments 
directly compensate treated villagers to deliver a particular ecosystem service. In contrast, our 
RCT study aimed at assessing whether such unconditional payments could trigger a short term 
behavioral response via indirect channels. Observation of a negative statistically significant 
impact on the amount of land brought under cultivation would be indicative that these channels 
can be relied upon if more sustained levels of funding were provided. Our study finds that 
unconditional payments have the opposite result (significant positive effect on additional 
amount of land cleared), suggesting that these payments could have an eroding effect outside 
protected areas as they lead to higher levels of agricultural activity and land clearance (albeit 
from farmbush, which is not of high conservation value).19 Although we do also find that 
mature forest areas were not targeted, we should be cautious in interpreting this as an 
unambiguous pro-conservation outcome. Villagers could have refrained from targeting mature 
forests as a gesture of goodwill towards the donor (in accordance with the ‘winning the hearts 
and mind’ or endorsement effect hypotheses of labeled unconditional transfers, as in 
Benhassine et al. 2015), though it is questionable whether the potentially more productive 
mature forest lands would not have been targeted if the aid could have provided access to 





possible that mature forests could be targeted (as shown in the study by Alix-Garcia et al. 
2013).  
Our findings also do not argue against unconditional transfer poverty alleviation 
schemes more generally. The indirect channels via which poverty alleviation transfers might 
impact on land use suggest the net conservation effect will vary from one context to the next. 
For example, the effect will depend on market integration, as this will determine the extent to 
which extra labor can be hired (affecting the balance between income and substitution effects 
at the household level), or the extent to which general equilibrium effects may be expected to 
occur. The availability of (land- or labor-saving) production technologies will also matter, as 
may the degree to which sustainable forest use is compatible with rural livelihoods. For these 
reasons we emphasize that the findings from the labor-scarce and land-abundant forest edge in 
rural Sierra Leone need not spill over to other contexts.  
Overcoming the reasons that NGOs opt for unconditional payments may in the future 
become more feasible. This is perhaps more realistically achievable by overcoming practical 
obstacles towards conditionality (for example new technologies can make monitoring and 
enforcement of conditions much more economical). Yet, there are deeper and persistent 
political and social reasons that make using conditions in conservation payments undesirable 
or infeasible. The realities of conservation programs suggest that compensation policies will, 
in many cases and contexts, continue to entail low levels of conditionality, in essence reflecting 
unconditional schemes. Extensive experience and case study examples from development 
economics suggest that such unconditional programs are more prevalent than realized 
(Haushofer and Shapiro 2016, Engel 2015, Honey-Rosés et al. 2009). It is therefore important 
that the key design elements of such programs are subjected to experimentation, including the 
degrees of conditionality, the institutions delivering the payments, the framing or labeling used 





shows how RCTs can be used towards addressing such questions. Finally, our experience with 
undertaking one of the first RCTs applied to a conservation policy context, suggests that large 
scale field experiments can be more informative if they are conducted as part of mixed methods 
approach that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative inputs and research approaches.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Study area: Gola Rainforest National Park, Sierra Leone 
(A) Location of all villages in the seven chiefdoms of the Gola Rainforest National Park, and the extent of Rapideye imagery used for this study. 
(B) RapidEye imagery dated 13 January 2011 with ground truth pixels used for classification. (C) RapidEye imagery from 21 January 2013 and 






Figure 2. Land cover change January 2011 – Dec 2012/January 2013 
Change in land cover derived from post-classification differences between two land cover maps dated 13 January 
2011 and 06 December 2012/21 January 2013. Each map was classified into four land cover classes (mature forest, 
’farmbush’, bare soil, water), resulting in 16 possible combinations between the two time periods. Here we have 
aggregated those combinations into six classes of land cover change for illustrative purposes: (i) land that was 
classified as bare soil in both 2011 and 2013 (bare); (ii) land that changed from either farmbush or mature forest 
in 2011 to bare in 2013 (vegetation cleared); (iii) water; (iv) land that changed from bare in 2011 to farmbush in 
2013 (vegetation regrowth); (v) land that was classified as farmbush in both 2011 and 2013 (farmbush); and (vi) 






Table 1. Description of land Cover Classes used in RapidEye Classification 
 
Land cover class Description 
Bare ground Exposed soil substrate with little vegetation representing recently cleared and burnt land, as well as 
settlements and roads. Also includes active agricultural land that is managed through weeding and 
harvesting.  
Mature forest Tree dominated vegetation that has not been clear cut within the past 25 years. Includes historically 
selectively logged forests, and sacred groves and forested burial grounds that are never used for 
agriculture. 
Farmbush Vegetated land cover that is not mature forest, typically fallowed land which may include tree-
dominated land covers such as young secondary woodland; also herbaceous vegetation. 















T-C at baseline T-C Standard 
error 
p-value N 
Altitude (m above sea level) 133 -0.63 9.77 0.95 79 
Total village land area (hectares) 515.01 52.42 90.45 0.56 79 
Chief quality index. Village average to household 
question “Is your chief a good chief? (=1 if yes) 
0.87 0.05 0.03 0.09 79 
Average age of household heads (years) 40.62 -1.53 0.86 0.07 79 
% male 0.62 -0.03 0.04 0.47 79 
% of households with tin roof 0.34 0.01 0.06 0.81 79 
Average amount of rice harvested (in bushels) 5.6 -0.39 0.66 0.55 79 
Distance to Gola Rainforest National Park (km) 5.65 -0.44 0.55 0.42 79 
Distance to Liberia (km) 18.95 1.71 1.16 0.14 79 
Distance to nearest major road (km) 4.11 -1.11 0.65 0.09 79 
Population in 2010 117.64 -27.86 17.98 0.12 79 
Average slope (degrees) 6.04 -0.01 0.5 0.98 79 
Number of families that can stand for chief 2.5 -0.02 0.44 0.96 79 
Vegetation cover in 2011 (hectares) 421.78 34.48 79.98 0.67 79 
Mature forest cover in 2011 (hectares)  120.73 -29.1 44.03 0.51 79 
Education level of chief (years of formal education) 6.59 -0.16 1.15 0.89 79 
Size of land farmed by chief (hectares) 40.14 -15.86 28.62 0.58 79 
Number of wives chief has 2.00 -0.13 0.3 0.67 79 
Chief years in power 18.94 -2.4 3.79 0.53 79 
Number of village forest management bylaws 3.71 -0.61 0.43 0.15 79 
Bylaw for logging (=1 if yes) 0.71 0.03 0.13 0.83 79 
Bylaw for hunting (=1 if yes) 0.47 -0.06 0.12 0.66 79 





Villagers log commercially outside GRNP (=1 if yes) 0.24 0.07 0.11 0.50 79 
Villagers hunt outside GRNP (=1 if yes) 0.59 0.19 0.12 0.12 79 
Villagers mine in forest outside GRNP? (=1 if yes) 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.32 79 
Village experienced drought within five years from 
baseline (=1 if yes) 
0.65 -0.02 0.12 0.86 79 
Village experienced crop disease within five years from 
baseline (=1 if yes) 
0.94 0.06 0.06 0.31 79 
Note: Number of villages in control n = 17, treatment = 62, column (5) presents robust p-values from OLS regression controlling for 





Table 3. Village Level Analysis of Program Impacts on Land Use Change 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Any vegetation to 
bare 






Mature forest to 
bare 
Mature forest to 
bare 
Treatment 19.111** 20.599** 18.886** 19.391** 0.225 1.208 
 (8.267) (8.022) (7.726) (7.444) (1.329) (1.231) 
Chief is good (std)  -4.448  -3.691  -0.756 
  (3.425)  (3.137)  (0.729) 
Average age (std)  6.728  6.711
*  0.017 
  (4.180)  (3.844)  (0.757) 
Distance to road 
(std) 
 -8.504  -9.830
*  1.326 
  (6.039)  (5.730)  (0.950) 
Constant 42.697*** 42.258*** 39.673*** 40.111*** 3.024*** 2.147* 
 (10.097) (10.199) (9.664) (9.750) (1.073) (1.101) 
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Note: OLS regressions including randomization blocks (chiefdom). The dependent variables are the hectares that transition from any type of 
vegetated land in 2011 to ‘bare’ soil in 2013; ‘farmbush’ land to ‘bare’ soil and ‘mature forest’ land to ‘bare’ soil. Missing values for controls are 





Table 4. Pixel Level Analysis of Program Impacts on Land Use Change  
 


























Treatment 0.034 0.041** 0.039** 0.037* 0.043** 0.042*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Total village 
land area (std) 
 -0.023
** -0.019***  -0.022
** -0.019***  -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.006)  (0.010) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Chief is good 
(std) 
  0.002   -0.003   0.006
** 




**   0.020
**   0.001 




***   -0.026
***   0.003 
   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.002) 
Distance to 
GRNP (std) 
  0.004   0.005   -0.001 
   (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.002) 
Slope   -0.011
**   -0.010
**   -0.002 
   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.002) 
Constant 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.069*** 0.007 0.007 0.003 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations 3375 3375 3375 3343 3343 3343 3064 3064 3064 
# Clusters 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Note: Regressions include chiefdom level fixed effects. Dependent variable are pixels that transition from any type of vegetated land in 2011 to ‘bare’ 
soil in 2013; ‘farmbush’ land to ‘bare’ soil and ‘mature forest’ land to ‘bare’ soil. Missing values for controls are imputed at treatment arm mean and 






Table 5. Stated Land and Labor Behavioral Changes in Treatment Group  
Changes in land farmed/converted as a result of aid Freq. Percent 
Farm/convert less land 130  10.07 
Farm/convert same land 792 61.35 
Farm/convert more land 369 28.58 
Total 1291 100 
 
 
Changes to labor inputs in farming/ logging and other 
activities as a result of aid 
Freq. Percent 
Work less 150 11.75 
Work equal 739 57.87 
Work more 388 30.38 







Table 6. Stated Harvest Amount at EL (Household Level) 
 (1) (2) 
 Bushels harvested at EL Bushels harvested at EL 
Treatment -1.178 -1.132 
 (0.949) (0.865) 
T*Bushels harvested at BL 0.236** 0.229** 
 (0.117) (0.110) 
Bushes harvested at BL 0.021 0.022 
 (0.094) (0.090) 
Good Chief (std)  -0.093 
  (0.313) 
Average age (std)  0.263 
  (0.309) 
Distance to road (std)  -0.072 
  (0.256) 
Constant 8.485*** 8.497*** 
 (0.878) (0.868) 
Observations 1942 1942 
Note: Regressions include chiefdom level fixed effects. Missing values for controls are imputed at treatment arm mean and standardized. 
Standard errors are clustered by village. The dependent variables is bushels of rice harvested at end line. Standard errors in parentheses. * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 6. Stated harvest amount at EL 
 (1) (2) 
 Bushels harvested at EL Bushels harvested at EL 
Treatment -1.178 -1.132 
 (0.949) (0.865) 
T*Bushels harvested at BL 0.236** 0.229** 
 (0.117) (0.110) 
Bushes harvested at BL 0.021 0.022 
 (0.094) (0.090) 
Good Chief (std)  -0.093 
  (0.313) 
Average age (std)  0.263 
  (0.309) 
Distance to road (std)  -0.072 
  (0.256) 
Constant 8.485*** 8.497*** 
 (0.878) (0.868) 
Observations 1942 1942 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.022 
Note: Regressions include chiefdom level fixed effects. Missing values for controls are imputed at treatment arm mean and standardized. Standard 
errors are clustered by village. The dependent variables is bushels of rice harvested at end line. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 








1 Field experiments have been used in the context of environmental issues and land use. For example, Jack (2013) 
analyses how auctions can help reveal private information about the performance of landowners under different 
incentive schemes. See also Greenstone and Jack (2015) and Curzon and Kontoleon (2016) about the potential of 
experimental methods for improving environmental and resource economics analyses in the context of developing 
countries. 
2 The empirical support for the effects of PES schemes on deforestation is summarized in Samii et al. (2014) and 
Börner et al. (2016, 2017). They make a strong case for using RCTs to evaluate impacts. Jayachandran et al. aims 
to assess the efficacy of a PES program in Uganda that pays households to conserve private mature forest lands. 
The authors are assessing a scheme that has higher levels of conditionality to ours. There are several other key 
contextual and design differences between the two studies that makes a direct comparison of the relative efficacy 
of conservation payment schemes with different degrees of conditionality difficulty. Yet, the Jayachandran et al. 
(2017) study has some useful similarities to ours, for example they also focus on assessing short term impacts on 
land cover and provide payments that are comparable in magnitude to ours. This allows for a useful comparison 
of our corresponding results. There are two more relevant projects underway both taking place in Bolivia that also 
use an RCT framework to assess the impacts of conservation payments. The first looks at payments for reducing 
deforestation in order to deliver downstream watershed services. The second compares the relative performance 
of direct payments vs. offering capacity building for improving grazing practices. Results from these projects are 
not currently published (but are referred to in Grillos 2017).  
3 For example, they allow for better targeting of aid, they could be less distortionary on local prices than cash, 
they could avoid crowding out of certain desirable behaviors, and they offer protection of recipients against 
rampant price inflation (Hidrobo et al. 2014; Aker 2017). 
4 A different set of concerns have been voiced for conditional PES schemes. For example, PES schemes may 
crowd out pro conservation behavior or lead to leakage effects where conversion is intensified outsides areas 
covered by the PES (Engel, 2015). 
5 Attaching conditions on conservation payments is a hard sell in many conservation settings, and particularly 
when working outside protected areas. For our specific case the NGO was concerned that the local communities 
may perceive the introduction of conditions as a covert form of ‘land grabbing’. Another challenge had to do with 
the property right structure in the region which was not particularly suitable for introducing a quid pro quo 
compensation scheme. Lastly, the cost of enforcing conditionality was rendered to be well beyond the budgetary 
resources and capabilities of the Gola authorities. Some of these obstacles are more easily resolved than others. 
The land grabbing fears (that go hand-in-hand with fears over loss of food security) are still a serious concern and 
can only be overcome with the deepening of institutions in Sierra Leone. Practical considerations could be 
overcome with more local community participation in monitoring as well as with the introduction of the new 
enforcement technologies which can significantly reduce the operating costs of introducing conditionality. The 
experiment is part of a larger research program to understand how institutions and (unconditional) distribution 
modalities affect conservation behavior and livelihoods. These treatment arms are beyond the scope of this paper 
and have all been collapsed. 
6 Before receiving their vouchers, communities were told that: “We are here representing the Gola Forest 
Programme and the Government of Sierra Leone. We want to help your village by providing you with livelihood 
aid to show our mutual support for conserving the Gola Forest.” The full protocol is available from the authors. 
7 The pool of eligible villages was determined by the NGO. Our research team then randomly selected treated and 
control groups within this set of villages.  
8 This decision was taken by the NGO as they felt it reflected the realities of any future stream of payments which, 
due to the specific socio-institutional setting, would have to be necessarily flexible and ‘light touch’ in terms of 
detailed conditions. 
9 Beyond the economics reason in favor of vouchers noted by the literature, in our case the use of vouchers rather 
than cash arose due to specific regulations set by the collaborating policy organizations. Due to past experience, 
the GRNP moved away from making cash transfers to in-kind transfers. One concern had to do with the safety of 
field staff in transporting large sums of cash in remote areas. It is likely that whether cash versus in-kind payments 
are used, or whether another dimension of the compensation mechanism is altered (for example the magnitude, 
frequency or duration payments), could impact behavior (Aker, 2017). The impact of such design elements for 
conservation payments constitutes a significant area of ongoing research (Engel 2015). 
10 GDP per capita in Sierra Leone in 2011 stood at an average of $374 (WDI, 2015). This is likely much lower in 
rural areas (for example poverty headcount in Kenema district was 62% in 2011). The grant is valued at central 
market prices in Kenema. This implies that the total value of the project in each village is substantially higher as 







                                                                                                                                                        
11 Clearing and burning of land for agriculture occurs in this area between January and March. Our observations 
cover two agricultural cycles: clearance between January and March 2011 prior to payments being made, and one 
subsequent clearance cycle between Jan and March 2012, after payments were made.  
12 Classification was undertaken using a supervised pixel-based approach and maximum likelihood classifier, 
including optical bands, texture metrics calculated at two window sizes (5 x 5 and 21 x 21) and vegetation indices). 
Ground truth data gathered from field observation and google earth imagery. The classification resulted in an 
overall classification accuracy of 97.7% for 2011, 99.9% for 2012, and 95.0% for 2013. Post classification analysis 
was conducted in ArcGIS 10.3. Full details of the classification procedure are in Annex 5.  
13 Most clearance within the park boundary occurred in the north of the study site: Gola South = 0.02% pixels 
changed from forest to bare, 0.03% farmbush to bare; Gola Central = 0.09% pixels changed from forest to bare, 
0.09% farmbush to bare; Gola North = 0.18% pixels changed from forest to bare, 0.52% farmbush to bare. 
14 We could not explore the impact of payments on individual (as opposed to village level) land use behavior 
because attributing pixels to individual households was not possible. This does not in any way diminish the 
usefulness of our analysis as our main aim is to ultimately evaluate impacts at the village level.  
15 It is common in studies such as these to use unweighted Voronoi polygons or circular buffers to assign land 
clearance to individual villages. By using both spatial information and survey data from villages in 
multiplicatively weighted Voronoi polygons we were able to increase the correlation coefficient between surveyed 
village area and mapped areas from 0.18 to 0.68 compared with unweighted Voronoi polygons. Further 
information on the exact validation procedure, and as well the method used to generate the polygons is detailed 
in (Wilebore and Coomes, 2016). 
16 We also explored the impact of elevation in addition to slope but the as the two variables were highly collinear 
we did not include elevation in the final analysis. Replacing slope with elevation produces the same type of results. 
17 Using survey data, we explore whether specific variables evaluated at their baseline levels were associated with 
heterogeneous treatment effects within the treatment group. We chose variables for which (a) we have baseline 
values and that (b) have some theoretical or policy relevant reason as to why treatment may have heterogeneous 
effects. In particular, we consider whether the effects of the intervention varied across the following dimensions: 
distance to roads and markets, the quality of local governance, amount of (mature forest) land and population. In 
essence we run models as specified in Eq1 but now with the inclusion of these variables interacted with the 
treatment dummy variable. Results are in tables A7 in Annex 1. None of these interaction terms entered 
significantly at conventional significance levels except and as expected in village level models total land area 
(p=0.06) and population size (p=0.11). Do note that our analysis is likely underpowered.  
18 We acknowledged that all such RCT studies when applied to real social policies potentially suffer from the 
added noise that they cannot be truly blind (so participants may know which experimental group they are assigned 
to) while often participants (in both treated and control groups) may alter their behaviour when they know they 
are part of an experimental study and their actions monitored (e.g. leading to various behavioural distortions such 
as the “Hawthorne” and “John Henry” effects; see Chassang, Padro i Miquel, and Snowberg 2012; Duflo, 
Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). In our current study, participants did not know that their endline land clearance 
behaviour would be observed (they could not have known of the existence of our remote sensing data) nor were 
they told that we would revisit their village for a follow up (end-line) survey to ask them questions related to land 
use. Hence, such “observer effects” should have been muted. Of course, although we did not inform either of the 
two experimental groups (treated and control) of the existence of the other group, we cannot rule out that this 
information was found out in some villages (especially for villages that are located relatively nearby to each other).  
19 Though comparisons with the study by Jayachandran et al. (2017) are informative, the two studies differ in 
several key parameters to make for a direct credible comparison between conditional and unconditional 
conservation payment schemes. Such comparisons are best served by undertaking experimental studies with 
multiple treatment arms within the same study region and policy context. 
